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REVIEW OF D AVID E. B ERNSTEIN'S 
You CAN'T SAY THAT I-THE GROWING 
THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER • 
The tension between the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and federal, 
state, and local antidiscrimination laws frequently is overlooked because 
discriminatory conduct is not viewed as falling within the protection of the First 
Amendment. Because the First Amendment protects association, as well as speech 
and the free exercise of religion, and because antidiscrimination laws can limit 
speech, particularly those laws that reach harassment, and mandate association, the 
tension is quite common. Professor Bernstein's point is that the tension is 
widespread and, unfortunately, the antidiscrimination or civil rights laws are 
trumping the c1villiberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. In other words, in 
his view there IS a significant tension and civil rights laws are winning the battle all 
too frequently. 
Intolerant activists are determined to impose their moralistic views on all 
Americans, regardless of the consequences for civil liberties. These zealots are 
politically well-organized and are a dominant force in one of the two major 
political parties. They have already achieved many legislative victories, especially 
at the local level, where they often wield disproportionate power. Courts have 
often acquiesced to their agenda, even when it conflicts directly with constitutional 
provisions protecting civil liberties. Until the power of these militants is checked, 
the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and freedom of religion 
will be in constant danger. 
The clash of civil liberties and antidiscrimination laws has emerged due to the 
gradual expansion of such laws to the point at which they regulate just about all 
aspects of American life. This expansion of antidiscrimination laws, in turn, 
reflects a shift in the primary justification for such laws from the practical, 
relatively limited goal of redressmg harms visited upon previously oppressed 
groups, especially African Americans, to a moralistic agenda a1med at eliminating 
all forms of invidious discrimination. Such an extraordinarily ambitious goal 
cannot possibly be achieved~r even vigorously pursued without grave 
consequences for civil liberties.' 
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When courts actually confront the tension betw·een the first Amendment and 
anudiscrimmauon laws, frequently the key 1ssue is whether the government has a 
compelling interest m the antidiscrimination provision that trumps the F1rst 
Amcndment.2 Professor Bernstein is cnucal of the fact that courts. 10cluding the 
~upreme Court, have agreed that there is a compelling interest m eradtcatmg 
d1 crimination) He believes the courts are too willing to find that the 
government's interest m eradicatmg discnmmation is compellmg.4 To be 
compelling, he says the •·mterest should be so v1tal that 11 would be virtuall) 
uic1dal for soc1ety not to hmit civil liberties in order to pursue it."~ Government 
antcrests that are merely important are not sufficient to trump speech and 
association rights protected by the First Amendment.6 Professor Bernstem is 
particularly critical of liberal law professors and the Amencan Civil L1berties 
Union ("ACLU"), "with otherwise impeccable civil libert1es credentials," for 
abandoning c1vil hbcrt1es in favor of ctvtl rights based. m part. on a perceived 
constitutional value of equality reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment.~ Even if 
the Constitution protects such an abstract value, Professor Bemstcm says there is 
no conflict between the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the latter proh1bits only the states from denymg equal protectton of the laws and 
does not address mdmduals who engage in rac1st speech.!! 
Professor Bernste10's real concern 1s wtth laws that prohibit private 
discnmination agamst members of groups which were never v1ewed as needmg the 
help of the Equal ProtectiOn Clause to achieve equality and wh1ch, 10 fact, have 
done quite well m tmproving therr status in society because of the f1rst 
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of exprcssion.9 lromcally, he says, some are 
.,.. illing to erode the protection of the First Amendment, a vttal factor 10 the dnve 
for equality, for the short-term gam of antidtscrimmation laws that can be changed 
liBERTIES f'ROM A'-TIDIS<.'RI\11~ATIO'\ LAWS I. 4 (2003). 
::!. As a general maucr. re:.trictions on speech that are contcnl-b<bed arc subJected to stnct 
scrutiny \\hen challenged on first Amendment grounds. See. e.g., Boos v. Barry. 4R5 lJ S. 312 
( 19 1. This means government can JUSUty the restnction only 1f it has a compelhng intere~t and 
lhe restnclion is narrowly tailored to serve that Interest. 
3. BER.\ISTEI'\. wpra note I. at II. 
·t Jd. 
5. Jd. This is no1 the current Court' s definition of a compelling governmental interc~t. 
6. The dtfierence between a compelhng and important governmental interest is less than 
clear and m many s1tuauons reasonable people could differ m their asscs,ment of the 
go\emment's intere. t. 1-'or example, m Roherts v Unued States Javcee.f. 468 U.S 609. 623 
(1984). the Court held that Mmnesota had a "compellmg interest m cradtcaung d1scrimmation 
agams1 its female citi.tens." However. m Boy Scouts of Am. ~·. Dale, 530 L S. 640, 659 (2000), 
the Court held that New Jersey's Interests m us "pubhc accommodations law do notJusllfy s.Jch a 
SC\Cre intrusion on the Boy Scout~· nghts to freedom of exprcsSI\c assoc.allon," apparently 
concluding that Ne\\ Jersey's interest tn bannmg dtscnminauon by the Boy Scouts based on 
sexual onentation IS not compelling. In another context, an equal protectiOn challenge to the 
Um\crsity of M1ch1gan Law School admissiOns program. the Court held that an educalional 
mstuuuon has "a compelling mJcrcst in attammg a d1verse student body.. Grutter v Dolhngcr, 
53~ l' s 306, 327 (2003). 
DfR\ISII 1', wpra note I, at 12. 
~. !d. at 12 13 
9. /d. at 14 22 
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easily and quickly. tO While Professor Bernstein overstates the problem. in light of 
the Court's narrowing interpretation of most civil rights statutes and ih approval of 
many governmental restrictions on speech, his concern is legitimate. Whether or 
not one agrees with his view of the extent of the problem, his book serve an 
important function in pointing out a tension that is overlooked or ignored too 
frequently. 
To place the tension between civil liberties and civtl rights in perspectl\e, n 
tmportant to remember that despite the language of the First Amendment that "{the 
government] shall make no law .... "It its protection is not absolute. 1 ~ The Free 
Exercise Clause is not only not absolute, it has been rendered rclati\el) 
meaningless as a source of religious freedom by the Court's dcctston in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.ll Whtle not 
absolute, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, including 
expressive association, 14 generally trumps government regulatton of speech unl 
government survives heightened scrutiny, i.e., government has a compelhng 
interest in regulating speech and utilizes the least restrictive means of serYing tts 
interest. IS Of course, reasonable people can differ on "hat is "compelling .. and 
what is "least restrictive." Desptte this broad constitutional protection for speech. 
there arc several circumstances where the Supreme Court has upheld a restnction 
on speech. 
One example of such restrictions is found in the so-called unprotected 
categories of speech, such as obscenity,I6 fighting words,17 libel and slander,• 
child pornography,I9 and advocacy of illegal activity.20 While it is easy to li t the 
categones, it is often difficult to determine whether speech fits within one of the 
unprotected categories, such as obscenity.21 It is not clear whether making these 
10. ld 
II U.S. Co~ST. amend. I. 
12. Set Korugsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36,49 ( 1961). 
13. 494 U S. 872. 882 ( 1990) (holdmg that religion neutral laws of general applicabilicy do 
not tngger heightened scrutmy when challenged on free exerc1sc grounds). But .~ee Church of the 
Lukum1 Babalu Aye v. Cny of H1alcah. 508 U.S. 520. 547 ( 1993) (holding that a law targetul8 
religious behef'i must satisfy stnct scrutmy when challenged on free exercise ground<;). 
14 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 u.S. 609, 622 ( 1984) ("We ha\c I 
understood as ~mphcit in the nght to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a 
correspondmg right to associate w1th others in pursuit of a w1dc variety of pohtu .. "l!l, socul. 
cconorruc. educational. rehg10us, and cultural ends.") llowcvcr, the "nght to associate for 
express!\ c purposes IS not ... absolute." /d. at 623. 
15 ld 
16. Se~ e.g., Miller" Cahfom1a, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
17. See, e.g, Chap Iinsk-y v. 1\cw Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 ( 1942). 
18. See, e.g .• Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Ne\\ York Time~ Co. v. 
U.S. 254 (1964). 
19 See, e.g, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 US. 234 (2002); New Yor~ \ 
458 L.S 747 (1992). 
20 See e.g. Brandenburg v Oh10, 395 U.S. 444 ( 1969). 
21 Hiller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court set the followmg gmdelincs for determining " 
matcnal is ob"(:cne: 
(a) whether 'the average person. applymg contemporary community standards' would 
fmd that the work, taken as a whole. appeals to the prurient mtercst. . ; (bl \\hether 
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categories of speech unprotected is justified by a compelhng government interest 
or the low value of the speech, or a combination of the two. While the Court has 
been reluctant to admit that there is a hierarchy of speech Yalue, it seems quite 
apparent that political speech ranks higher than pornography or sexually explicit 
speech.22 If the protection of speech is not absolute. maybe it makes sense to 
assign constitutional value to speech. As Justice Stevens put it, "fe\\ of us would 
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the cttizen's right to see 
'Specified Sexual Activttics' exhibttcd in the theaters of our choice."23 The 
problem, of course, is that assigning value is dtfficult. Until 1975, commercial 
speech was constdered unprotected,24 but in recent years it has enjoyed great 
protection.25 Content-neutral regulations of speech, such as time, place or manner 
restnctions, are generally easter for government to justtfy, with the Court applymg 
a level of scrutiny less than strict.26 This seems acceptable because the speaker is 
not stlenced and, if the regulation tS truly content-neutral, there is less chance that 
the government is suppressing a particular message. Similarly, symbolic speech is 
more susceptible to regulation if the goal 1s to regulate the conduct, not the 
message.:? In addition, government regulation of speech on government-owned 
property that is treated as a nonpublic forum ts subjected to only rational basis 
review as long as the regulation is not viewpomt-based.28 
!d. 
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offens1ve way, sexual conduct ~pecifically 
defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole. lacks 
senous literary, artistic, pohucal, or sc1ent1fic value. 
22. See, e.g, Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 ( 1976) 
23 Id at 70. 
24. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 ( 1975) (holding that speech 1s not stripped of its 
First Amendment protection merely because 11 is commerc1al speech). 
25. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States ~ed. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002): Lonllard Tobacco 
Co. v. Re11ly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); 44 L1quorMan, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517l,;.S. 484 (1976). 
The intermediate scrutiny standard for commerc1al speech v.as amculatcd by the Court m Cent 
Hud.fon Gus & Elec. Corp.\. Pub. Serv Comm ·n of'\'ew York, 447 US. 557,566 (1980) 
26 See, e.g. Hefron \. lnt' l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness. 452 U.S. 640, 648 (191:11) 
(holding reasonable time, place and manner restrictions are approved "provided that they arc 
JUStified w1thout reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a sigruficant 
governmental mtcrcst, and that m domg so they lea"e open ample altcrnatwe channels for 
communication of the mformation," (quotmg Vrrg1ma Pharm. Bd \. Yugmia Cuuen Consumer 
Counc1l, 425 U.S 748, 771 (1971 ))). See alw Hill v. Colorado, 530 lJ.S . .,03, 719-20 (2000) 
(notmg that the pnnc1plc inqull)' in deterrrumng content ncutrahty is "whether the goYernmcnt 
has adopted a rcguJat1on of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys") 
(quotmg Ward v. Rock Agamst Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 ( 1989)). 
/d. 
27 See Umted States v. 0' Bnen, 191 U.S 367, 377 ( 1968). The Court noted: 
[A] gm·cmment regulation 1s suffic1ently justified 1f it b within the constitutional 
power of the Government; if 11 furthers an 1mportant or substantial governmental 
intcrc:.t. if the go"emmental interest IS umelatcd to the suppressiOn of free expressiOn: 
and if the mcidental restrict•on on alleged F1rst Amendment freedoms IS no greater 
than IS essenual to the furtherance of that mtercst. 
28. See. e.g., lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna ConsciOusness. Inc.\ Lee. 505 L.S. 672, 679 (1992). 
See aim Good News Club v. Milford Cent Sch .• 533 U.S. 98, 107~8 (2001) (holdmg that 
government can establish a limued public forum and reserve the forum for certain groups or the 
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Aside from the forum analysis, the context and location in which one chooses to 
speak may detennine whether the speech is protected. Government employees' 
speech frequently leads to dtsciphne or discharge and their First Amendment 
claims fail if a court detennines that they were not speakmg on a matter of public 
concern or, even if the speech concerns such a matter, a court detennines the 
government's interest, as an employer, in avoiding disruption in the workplace 
trumps the First Amendment interest.29 ln fact, the Court has detennined that the 
government as an employer has a compelhng interest in "labor peace."30 
Similarly, while students do not leave thetr First Amendment protection behind 
when they enter a public school, their right to speak is discounted because of the 
school's interest in avoiding substantial disruption that interferes with the purpose 
of the school--education. 31 
The point is stmply that the tensiOn between civil liberties and civil rights must 
be analyzed in hght of a rather complex, and maybe not always consistent, body of 
Ftrst Amendment jurisprudence that recognizes many circumstances where 
restrictions on speech are justified. This does not mean that we should accept 
more restrictions on speech, or use existing restrictions as a justification for more. 
Rather, in a world where First Amendment jurisprudence already allows a wide 
variet} of restnctions on speech, including some restrictiOns resulting from 
antidiscrimination laws, it may be that most of the restrictions imposed by 
antidiscrimination laws should be tolerated. 
Many discriminatory acts have nothing to do with speech, association, or 
religion, and this probably explains why the Ftrst Amendment is not raised as a 
defense in most litigation based on the antidiscrimination laws. But, m some 
circumstances application of an antidiscrimination law clearly implicates the First 
Amendment. Examples are the laws that treat harassment, including verbal 
harassment, as a fonn of discrimination. Assume a private employer hires African 
American applicants to avoid liability under laws such as Title Vll of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196432 and 42 U.S.C. § 198J.33 but tolerates or encourages severe or 
pervasive \erbal ractal harassment of these employees by both supervisors and co-
workers, knowing that the harassment makes it impossible for the African 
American employees to perfonn satisfactorily. Further assume that the verbal 
harassment consists of the ugliest derogatory comments conveying the message 
that these minority workers arc not wanted in the workplace. Giving the targeted 
employees a claim based on ctther of these federal statutes penalizes speech. A 
separate question is whether application of the federal statutes violates the First 
Amendment. 
If we conclude that application of these federal statutes to this situation violates 
d1scuss1on of certam topics, as long as it does not d1scnmmatc on the basis of vicwpomt and the 
rcstnctton is reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum). 
29 See, e.g.. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); P1ckering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 
563 ( 1968). 
30. Abood'-· Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217 32 ( 1977). 
31. Tinker'" Des \fomcs Indep. Cmty. Seh. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 { 1969). 
32. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 24 1, 253- 66 {codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000c-17 {2000)). 
33. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 {2000). 
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the First Amendment, then we are saying that government cannot assure equal 
opportunity m employment because the First Amendment protects those who 
decide to drive some employees out of the workplace because of their race. 
Similar ractal harassment may be designed to deny equal opportunity in housmg, 
in violation the Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA"),34 or in education, in violation 
of Title VI ofthe Civil Rtghts Act of 1964 ("Title VI").35 Here too, ifwe conclude 
that the First Amendment trumps the FHA and Title VI, we are saying government 
cannot assure equal opportunity in housing and education. Current First 
Amendment jurisprudence suggests a First Amendment challenge to the 
application of the civil rights statutes to the three situations described would trigger 
strict scrutiny because wh1le the statutes are viewpoint neutral, i.e., they protect 
anyone who IS subjected to harassment because of race,36 the statutes are content-
based because they address speech that makes the target too uncomfortable to 
continue to work, live in a house, or attend schooJ.37 However, the Court's 
decision in Roberts \., United States Jaycees suggests application of the three 
statutes would be upheld because government has a compelling interest in 
addressing race discrimination in employment, housing, and education.38 
Upholding application of the civil rights statutes in these three situations 
represents a restriction on speech. Is such a restriction justified? In addition to the 
compelling government mtercst argument, one could argue that the speech, 
intended to harass for the purpose of denying equal opportumty in employment, 
housing, and education, has a low value and is therefore subject to more 
restrictions.39 Also, application of the civil rights statutes simply changes the 
location of the speech because the speakers remain free to express their vtews on 
equality outside the workplace, away from the targeted home, and away from the 
school. They are restricted only insofar as their speech interferes with an 
individual's access to employment, housing, or an education. The restncted 
speech is the rough eqUivalent of a punch in the nose as a means of telling 
someone she is not welcome because of her race. While we generally accept the 
principle that the expressive punch in the nose is not protected by the First 
34 Pub. L. o. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 901. 82 Stat. 73, 81-90 (cod1ficd as amended at 42 
L.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000)). A common form of"specch" dcs1gned to dnve African American 
fam1hcs out of their homes is a cross burning. In Virginia v Black, 538 U.S. 343. 347-48 (2003), 
the Court held "that while a State. consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning 
carried out wnh the mtcnt to mtimidate, the prov1s1on in the Vrrgm1a statute treating any cross 
burning as prima fac1e ev1dcnce of intent to mttmJdate renders the statute unconstitutional in its 
current form.'' 
35 Pub. L. No. 88-352. §§ 601 605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000)). 
36 Professor Bernstein says "[h]ostilc environment law clearly d1scnmmates based on 
new-pomt." BFRII.SH:JN, ~upra note I, at 31. Bill see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) 
(holdmg that a D1stnct of Columbia statute proh1b11ing d1splay of certam s1gns within five 
hundred feet of a fore1gn embassy was a content based restrictiOn but that the prov1s1on wa~ not 
VJcwpomt based). 
37. See Bom, 485 U.S. at 321. 
38. 468 U.S 609, 623 25 (1984) (holdmg that Minnesota has a compcllmg intei'Cl>t in 
cradicahng sex discnmmauon in places of public accommodation). 
39. f-urther, tf the speaker's mtcnt is not to commumcatc 1deas, but only to harass and 
intimtdatc, the "speech" may be more like conduct not protected by the First Amendment. 
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Amendment because of the government's interest in protecting individuals from 
bodily injury and maintaining the peace, it is not clear that the harm caused by the 
punch in the no e is greater than the harm caused by the verbal harassment.40 Of 
course, we can justify regulation of the conduct by pointing out that the regulation 
is not aimed at the message, only the means utilized.41 Similarly, we can argue 
that the restriction on verbal harassment is not aimed at the message, only the 
location.42 
If the First Amendment precludes application of the civil rights statutes in the 
situations discussed above, then the government is powerless to address an obvious 
denial of equal opportunity based on race. Professor Bernstein suggests the free 
economic market will correct the situation,43 but there is no evidence that this will 
work. Prejudice is rarely the product of rational behavior and neither the market 
nor the antidiscrimination laws have eliminated racial discrimination. 
Even if one concludes that civil rights statutes aimed at race discrimination in 
employment, housing, and education trump civil liberties, such a conclusion does 
not mandate that all antidiscrimination laws trump civil liberties. Professor 
Bernstein makes the point that antidiscrimination laws have been extended far 
beyond race.44 
Once the racial caste system was largely dismantled, and newly organized 
groups-such as older Americans, gays, and the disabled-began to use civil 
rights terminology in expressing their demands for government intervention on 
their behalf, antidiscrimination activists shifted their rhetorical emphasis.45 They 
no longer focused on historical and economic arguments regarding the need to end 
racial discrimination in employment and places of public accommodation. Rather, 
they argued that discrimination- as expansively defined by organized interest 
groups-should be banned as a moral eviJ.46 Once private-sector discrimination 
was portrayed primarily as a secular sin, rather than as an economic issue, the 
rhetorical goal of civil rights advocates became the elimination of invidious 
discrimination.47 
Bernstein argues that the shift in the primary justification for antidiscrimination 
Jaws, "from aiding previously oppressed groups to an austere moralism," led to a 
40. See. e.g., Collin v. Smtth. 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 06 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a city 
ordinance, destgned to prohibit a Nazi demonstration was unconstitutional. The court recognized 
the "psycluc trauma" caused by such speech. but concluded the city's concern with this injury did 
not justify the ordmances). 
41. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,381-82 (1968). 
42. Even as a restriction on location, it does not fit within the time, place and manner 
analysts because it is not really content-neutral. But see City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41,49 (1986) (treating an adult entertainment ordinance as content-neutral because 
it was aimed at the secondary effects rather than the content of the films); Grayned v. Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting "noise or diversion" ncar a school 
that would disturb the "peace or good order of such school"). 
43. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15- 16. 
44. See id. at 7 ("Antidiscrimination laws came to protect more and more groups against 
more and more types of discrimination."). 
45. /d. at 7. 
46. !d. at 8. 
47 !d. at 7. 
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broad expansion at all levels of government with antidiscrimination laws 
"protect[ing] more and more groups against more and more types of 
discrimination."48 It is this expansion of civil rights laws that most concerns 
Professor Bernstein. He discusses how these antidiscrimination laws have resulted 
in growing restrictions on speech, including workplace speech,49 artistic 
expression,so political speech,s1 and campus speech.52 Tn some situations, 
discussed in Chapter Six, he sees the antidiscrimination laws resulting in 
compelled speech.S3 Professor Bernstein is particularly critical of laws, often state 
or local, banning discrimination in broadly defmed public accommodations54 and, 
as a result, threatening the autonomy of private institutions and discouraging the 
formation of organizations for expressive purposes. 55 He also sees the effect of 
antidiscrimination laws on the religious freedom of, for example, religious 
schools56 and landlords,57 since they subject themselves to lawsuits when they act 
based on their beliefs about sexual morality. Another chapter argues that the right 
of privacy or intimate association is being compromised by the antidiscriminatiOn 
laws, using attacks on female-only health clubs as an example.ss Finally, Professor 
Bcrnstem is critical of the ACLU for abandoning its staunch defense of civil 
liberties when they conflict with civil rights laws. 59 
While the ACLU docs not need me to defend it, as a long-time member 1 
struggle w1th, but am not disappointed by, its decision to avoid an uncompromising 
positton that would automatically result in civil liberties trumping civil rights laws. 
ln Fir~t Amendment cases, the Court has sometimes mentioned inequality in access 
to avenues of expression as a result of the great disparity in resources, but has not 
attempted to correct the inequality.60 If there is such a thing as a marketplace of 
ideas,61 those with extensive resources have a better chance of selling their tdeas. 
Downtown street comers have been replaced, to a great extent by privately owned 
shopping malls that can restrict speech,62 and politicians rely heavily on high-
priced television ads to communicate their 1deas. While the internet might be an 
equalizer, at least to some extent, low-income families are less likely to have 
access to it. The point is simply this- if you are without a job, a home, or an 
48. /d. 
49 !d. at 23 34 (Chapter 2). 
50. /d. at 35-46 (Chapter 3). 
51. /d.at47 57(Chapter4). 
52. /d. at 59-72 (Chapter 5). 
53. /d. at 73-83 (Chapter 6). 
54. /d. at 85-96 (Chapter 7). 
55. /d. at 97- 110 (Chapter 8). 
56. ld at Ill 19 (Chapter 9). 
57. /d. at 121 30 (Chapter I 0). 
58. !d. at 131 44 (Chapter II). 
59. /d. at 145-53 (Chapter 12). 
60. See, e.g, C1ty of Ladue v. Gllleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1944); Martm v Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141,146(1943) 
61. Abrams v. Umted States, 250 U.S 616, 630 ( 1919) (Holmes, J, dJssentmg). 
62. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 ( 1972) (holding that actiOn of a pnvatcly-
owned shoppmg mall did not constitute government actiOn, subject to the First Amendment). 
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education because ofy"~ur race, age, disability. national origin, gender, relig•on. or 
sexual orientation, it is unlikely that you see the First Amendment as your sa\ ior 
If given a choice, you might vote for laws addressing discrimination even at the 
expense of the freedom of speech that you have no ability to exercise becau c ~ ou 
have no resources. Freedom of speech and expressive association will be m. re 
meaningful when there is greater equality in our society; the marketplace of 1Je 
will be much better when everyone has access. Of course, not all groups sc~l,n 
the protection of antidiscrimination laws are without resources. Nevertheles • I 
can understand the reluctance to conclude that civil liberties should always trump 
civil rights laws aimed at equality, particularly when the enjoyment of Cl\11 
liberties is extremely difficult for those who do not have "access" to them. 
Even if we accept this explanation, it does not answer some of Profc~ 
Bernstein's legitimate concerns. Most people would agree that equal acce~ to 
some things, maybe employment, housing, health care, and education. IS more 
important than equal access to other things, such as certain "pubh 
accommodations" and private religious schools. Similarly, people might agree that 
not all discrimination is equally offensive; implicit in the Court's equal protection 
jurisprudence, with the standard of review ranging from rational basis to 'tnC1 
scrutiny, is the notion that some types of discrimination, such as raetal 
discrimination, are more offensive than other types, like age.63 Also, civ1l ngh 
laws reflect the fact that some classifications are more likely to be legitimate than 
others by providing a "bona fide occupational qualification" defense. If tht 1 
true, does the denial of equal access to something of less importance to our wei -
being in society based on a less offensive classification just•l) 
antidiscrimination law that conflicts with civilliberties?64 
Tn chapters two through eleven of his book, Professor Bernstein gives exampl 
of laws and their application to specific situations in which he belie\'c~ Cl\ J 
liberties are being compromised without sufficient justification. These ex.trnpl 
include: 
• A Caucasian Department of Energy employee in Te:xa~ who 
"unwittingly spawned a harassment suit when he followed tq> a 
southwest Texas training session with a bit of self-deprecating humor.-
i.e., presenting colleagues who attended the training session\\ ith a 
certificate making each recipient an honorary "Coon Ass." a ''mild)) 
derogatory slang term for a Cajun," which was prompted by the fact 
that the area of the training session has a large Cajun populau 
including the author of the certificate; this led to a hostile em •ronmcnt 
action by an African American recipient of the certificate;M 
• the removal of pieces of art from a classroom at Penn State Unt\ crs n 
63. See United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 53 n.4 (1938). 
64. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley .. In h-Am 
Lesbian and Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). While a classtfication 
sexual orientation is offensive and usually without even a rational basis, acce. s to a parade 
the Boy Scouts may not be panicularly important. 
65. BtRNSTEIN, supra note I, at 27- 28. The plaintiff prevailed in the trial court 
case was senled while on appeal. /d. at 28. 1n most circuits, it would be difficult for the 
to satisfy the "severe or pervasive" requirement based on the facts b>ivcn. 
446 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 31, o. 2 
and city hall in Murfreesboro, Tennessee m response to complaints 
from a professor who taught in the classroom and a citizen who passed 
the art on the way to a meeting in city haJI, who found the art 
offensive, because of a concern about sexual harassment litigatJon;66 
• an attempt by a housing rights group "to purush opponents of a 
proposed public housing proJeCt in Berkeley" by filing a complaint 
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") 
alleging discrimination based on disability;67 
• discipline of university professors for what they say in the classroom, 
because of the university's fear of harassment litigation;68 
• government agencies dictating what appears in adverttsements69 and 
compelling violators of antidiscrimination laws to speak against their 
beliefs as part of a settlement or remedy; 70 
• treating "private clubs" as "public accommodations" and then 
compelling them to accept as members persons with whom they would 
prefer not to associate, i.e., "legally compelled association,"7 even 
where such compelled association interferes with the message of an 
expressive association; 72 
• requiring a Jesuit university, based on a local law banning 
discrimination against gays, to extend "university recogrution" to two 
gay student groups:73 
• attempting, by application of a Massachusetts fair housing law 
prohibiting discrimination based on marital status, to force a "devout 
Roman Catholic" couple to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple, 
contrary to their religious doctrine because it would facilitate 
fomication;74 and 
• application of Madison, Wisconsin's fair housing ordinance to a tenant 
who sublet three bedrooms to female housemates, but would not sublet 
a room to a lesbian applicant.75 
There are many other examples in chapters two through eleven, but th1s is a 
representative sample and I believe it is fair to sa)- that, in Professor Bernstein's 
view, the outcome of each of these cases is less important than the existence of 
antidiscrimination laws that encourage claims and cause defendants to devote 
resources to defending such claims.76 No doubt, the existence of. such laws, 
66. Jd. at39. 
67 /d. at 47-49. 
68. !d. at 66 71. 
69. ld at 76-81. 
70. Jd. at 73 76. 
71. /d. at 85 86. 
72 !d. at I 03 04. 
73 !d. at 114-15. 
74. Jd at 121-22. 
75. Jd. at 131-32. 
76. If a civ1l rights claim, based on a federal statute, is frivolous, a prevailing defendant is 
usually entitled to costs, including attorney fees. 
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combined with a broad interpretation and aggressive administrative enforcement, 
can have a chilling effect on potential defendants and their civil liberties because 
they are concerned about the costs of defending a claim. While overbreadth is a 
common basis for a first Amendment challenge to restrictions on speech,n it is 
measured by the language of the law and the courts' interpretation,78 not how a 
particular "timid" person chooses to modify his or her conduct in an effort to steer 
clear of costly admmistrative or judicial proceedings. 
The first example above involves racial discrimination in the form of 
harassment in the workplace and, as Professor Bernstein suggests, it probably does 
not meet the "severe and pervasive" standard, at least not in most circuits.79 
Nevertheless, he reports that the victim was successful in the trial court and the 
matter was settled before the appeal was beard.so Whether that result is good or 
bad, correct or incorrect, does not answer the broader question, i.e., whether laws 
that prohibit race discrimination, including racial harassment, in employment 
interfere \\ ith constituhonally protected civil liberties. As suggested earlier, 
because employment is important and the speech of the Department of Energy 
employee, the gag certificate, is of relatively low value, and because the restriction 
is limited to the location of the speech, one could reasonably conclude the 
antidiscrimmation law, if it even applies here, should trump freedom of speech. 
The situations presented in the second example may represent an unfounded 
prophylactic reaction by rwo instirutions. While a Penn State professor 
complained about the Naked Maja hanging in a classroom and it was removed, it is 
not clear that either the professor or students had a vtable sexual harassment claim 
against the university. The real question might be why a university would place in 
a classroom anything that may cause a distraction. In the other situation, it was the 
city's decision to remove a painting from city hall that triggered a First 
Amendment claim by the artist. While the city attorney expressed his concern 
about a Title Vll sexual harassment claim, it is not apparent that Title VlJ is in play 
since the complaining party, the one offended by the art, did not work in city hall 
but was there for a meeting.81 
77. See. e.g, City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vmcent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); 
Broadnck v Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601 ( 1973). 
78. See. e.g. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1990). 
79. BER."'STEI', .wpra note l , at 28. 
80. !d. 
81. There arc circumstances under which an employer can be held liable for the acts of non-
employees. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.ll(c) (2004). See also Linlc v. Windenncre Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 968 69 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that in the Ninth Circuit "employers arc liable for hamssing conduct by non-
employees 'where the employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking 
immediate and/or corrective actions when it knew or should have known of the conduct"') 
(quotmg Folkcrson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997)); Rodriguez-
HcrnandeL v. Miranda-Bclcz, 132 F.3d 848, 854 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Under Puerto Rico law, an 
employer is held responsible for 'the acts of sexual harassment towards his employees in the 
work place by persons not employed by him if the employer or his agents or supen isors kne\\ or 
should have known of such conduct and did not take immediate and adequate action to correct the 
situation."') (internal citation omttted). Even if Title Vll applies, tl is unlikely that the painting in 
City hall would be eonstdercd actionable sexual harassment. 
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HUD's pursuit of several individuals who spoke out against a zoning variance 
for a facility, in response to a complaint alleging a violation of the FHA because 
the opposition was based on the possibility that the facility might house persons 
with a disability, is the subject of the third example. While HUD ultimately 
dropped that investigation because the individuals acted within their First 
Amendment rights, Professor Bernstein says HUD's vigorous pursuit of the matter, 
including its referral to the Justice Department for prosecution, demonstrates the 
agency's disregard of the First Amendment in enforcing the FHA.82 A provision 
in the FHA makes it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any 
person in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected by [other 
provisions of the Act]."83 The difficulty with this case IS that there are lawful 
reasons for denying a variance and there are unlawful reasons, such as the prospect 
that persons with a disability will occupy the housing. If in fact the opponents 
were trying to persuade government officials to deny the variance because of the 
disability-or race, national origin, sex, or marital status-of the tenantl., they 
would be advocating illegal activity. Advocacy of illegal activity generally is not 
protected by the First Amendment. In contrast, advocating a change in a sectiOn of 
the FHA clearly would be protected speech. 
Disciplining professors, or other employees, for engaging in what might be 
considered harassment in violation of Title VI84 or Title vuss of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, or Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,86 raises First 
Amendment issues when the alleged harassment consists of speech. If students at 
a public college or university claim they are being denied an equal educational 
opportunity as a result of a professor's in-class attack on them because of their 
race, gender, or national origin, which may violate one of the civil rights statutes or 
the Equal Protection Clause, would university-imposed disciplinary action VIolate 
the professor's right to freedom of speech? First, assume the harassment is so 
severe or pervasive that it would m fact give the student a claim. Thus, the issue is 
whether the First Amendment trumps the right to an equal educatiOnal opportumty. 
Given the fact that the First Amendment is already discounted when applied to 
employee speech in the workplace, based on the Pickering-Connick line of cases,87 
one could conclude that the government has an interest sufficient to trump the 
location-based restriction on speech. The government's interest may be considered 
compelling and therefore sufficient to trump even a full-fledged First Amendment 
interest. Second, assume the harassment is not so severe or pervasive that it would 
give the students a claim, but the university disciplines the professor because it 
wants to enhance its position if there is litigation, i.e., it does not want to be 
painted as an institution that tolerates harassment by professors. Here the problem 
is not the civil rights laws; rather, the problem is a university that is overly 
concerned about litigation by the students and this concern may trigger a 
82. BeR.'lSTEIK, supra note I , at 49. 
83. 42 u.s.c. § 3617 (2000). 
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
86. Pub. L. No. 92-3 18, §§ 901 907, 86 Stat. 235, 373 75 (codlfied as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1688 (2000)). 
87. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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meritorious first Amendment claim by the professor against a public university.88 
As Professor Bernstein suggests, part of the problem is the fact that colleges and 
universities may adopt vague guidelines prohibiting harassment, thus chilling 
professors' speech in the classroom.89 The remedy for this is better guidelines, not 
abandonment of the restrictions that attempt to assure equal educational 
opportunity. 
While the compelled speech examples raise first Amendment concerns, at least 
when the speech is compelled by a court or an administrative agency rather than by 
a voluntary settlement, there may be a strong governmental interest in compelling 
speech as a remedy for a violation of a civil rights law.90 Where the compelled 
speech is commercial, it is less protected under the Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
v. Public Service Commission of New York standard.91 
Professor Bernstein sees laws that prohibit discrimination in public 
accommodations as a serious threat to the autonomy of private organizations, 
particularly expressive associations, because some states interpret the term "public 
accommodation" broadly to include, for example, the Boy Scouts of America,92 
the Rotary Club,93 and the Jaycees,94 and to prohibit discrimination on bases not 
included in Title 11 of the Civi l Rights Act of 1964,95 such as gender or sexual 
orientation. Further, he says state and local laws often have no, or a very limited, 
exemption for private clubs. Cases based on public accommodations laws raise 
questions about whether the group really is expressive and, if so, whether forced 
admission really changes the message.96 While Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and Title liT of the Americans with Disabilities Act,97 ("ADA") include a 
"private club" exemption to protect intimate association,98 most private clubs do 
not fit within the exemption because they are not truly private, i.e., they openly 
solicit members, and anyone who does not fit within the excluded category 
(African Americans or females) is welcome. If an association is expressive, and 
88. A professor would not have a First Amendment claim against a private umversity 
because its restriction on speech is voluntary, i.e., not compelled by law, and, therefore, there is 
no government action. 
89. BERNSTEIN, supra note I, at 67. 
90. For example, the Court has recognized a compellmg interest in government taking race 
into account in remedying a past violation of a federal statute or the Constitution. See, e.g .. 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
91. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Under this standard, the Court asks whether the speech is 
advertising illegal activities or whether it is false or decepuve (unprotected speech), whether the 
rcstrictton is JUStified by a substantial governmental interest, whether the law directly advances 
the government's interest, and whether the regulation is no more ex.tenstvc than necessary to 
achieve the government's interest. !d. at 566. 
92 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
93. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 ( 1987). 
94. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 ( 1984). 
95. Pub. L. , o. 88-352, §§ 201 - 207, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2000)). 
96. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 640; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609. 
97. Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 301 - 310, 104 Stat 327, 353 65 (codified as amended al42 
U.S.C. §§ 12181 to 12189 (2000)). 
98. The "private club" exemption is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (2000) (Tttlc 11). and 42 
U.S.C. § 12187 (2000) (Title Ill of ADA). 
450 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW (Vol. 31, No.2 
admission of the "unwanted" group would change its expression or message, then 
the question is whether the government has a compelling justification. In Roberts 
and Rotary Club, the Court upheld the application of public accommodations laws 
to clubs that excluded fcmales,99 however, in Dale and Hurley the Court held that 
application of such a state law to discrimination based on sexual orientation 
violated the First Amendment.lOO Maybe the different results are justified by the 
nature of the organizations, "business" organizations versus a parade and a social 
organization for young males, as well as government's more consistent effort (at 
least recently) to eliminate sex discrimination versus its checkered history relating 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
When an antidiscrimination law is applied to religious organizations or 
individuals claiming that compliance with the law would interfere with their 
religious beliefs, there is unlikely to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, as 
interpreted in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, JOt 
since such laws normally are neutral Jaws of general applicability and not aimed at 
a particular religion. Absent a showing that marital status discrimination actually 
causes a shortage of housing available to unmarried couples, one could conclude 
that there is no real justification for such laws, or at least no justification for such 
laws without a religious belief exemption, and municipalities should not adopt 
such ordinances and thereby avoid the problem. Why burden some landlords' 
religion if there is not really a problem? Similarly, one might ask why Madison, 
Wisconsin would include "housemates" in its fair housing ordinance; why impose 
intimate association absent a strong showing of a problem? 
While I believe Professor Bernstein may overstate the tension between civil 
liberties and civil rights laws, his book is very valuable in that it makes us aware of 
the tension or at least the potential for a tension. Such awareness may cause 
legislative and administrative bodies that make such laws and regulations, as well 
as the courts that interpret them, to more carefully weigh the competing interests in 
considering civil rights provisions. Even where a particular antidiscrimination law 
would not violate the Constitution under current interpretation, unless there is a 
showing of a denial of equal access or opportunity, the better course is to avoid 
passing laws that accomplish little while restricting or chilling civtl liberties. 
Because educational instttutions are in the business of promoting the exchange of 
ideas, they have a special duty to be sensitive to the potential for a tension between 
civil liberties and civil rights and to be particularly careful in drafting rules aimed 
at protecting civil rights. 
99. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Bd. ofDirs. of Rotary lnt'l ' '· Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 u.S. 
537, 547 (1987). 
100. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and 81-Sexual Group of 
Doston, 515 U.S. 557,573 (1995). 
\01. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
